We analyze the history of the equity risk premium from surveys of U.S. Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) conducted every quarter from June 2000 to June 2016. The risk premium is the expected 10-year S&P 500 return relative to a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield. The average risk premium in 2016, 4.02%, is slightly higher than the average observed over the past 16 years. We also provide results on the risk premium disagreement among respondents as well as asymmetry or skewness of risk premium estimates. We also link our risk premium results to survey-based measures of the weighted average cost of capital and investment hurdle rates. The hurdle rates are significantly higher than the cost of capital implied by the market risk premium estimates. JEL Classification: G11, G31, G12, G14
Introduction
We analyze the results of the most recent survey of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) conducted by Duke University and CFO Magazine. The survey closed on June 2, 2016 and measures expectations beginning in the second quarter of 2016. In particular, we poll CFOs about their long-term expected return on the S&P 500. Given the current U.S. 10-year Treasury bond yield, we provide estimates of the equity risk premium and show how the premium changes through time. We also provide information on the disagreement over the risk premium as well as average confidence intervals. Finally, we link the equity risk premium to measures used to evaluate firm's investments: the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and the investment hurdle rate.
Method

Design
The quarterly survey of CFOs was initiated in the third quarter of 1996.
1 Every quarter, Duke
University polls financial officers with a short survey on important topical issues (Graham and Harvey, 2009 ). The usual response rate for the quarterly survey is 5%-8%. Starting in June of 2000, a question on expected stock market returns was added to the survey. Fig. 1 summarizes the results from the risk premium question. While the survey asks for both the one-year and tenyear expected returns, we focus on the ten-year expected returns herein, as a proxy for the market risk premium.
The executives have the job title of CFO, Chief Accounting Officer, Treasurer, Assistant
Treasurer, Controller, Assistant Controller, or Vice President (VP), Senior VP or Executive VP of Finance. Given that the majority of survey respondents hold the CFO title, for simplicity we refer to the entire group as CFOs. 
Delivery and response
In the early years of the survey, the surveys were faxed to executives. The delivery mechanism was changed to the Internet starting with the December 4, 2001 survey. Respondents are given four business days to fill out the survey, and then a reminder is sent allowing another four days.
Usually, two-thirds of the surveys are returned within two business days.
The response rate of 5-8% could potentially lead to a non-response bias. There are six reasons why we are not overly concerned with the response rate. First, we do not manage our email list.
If we deleted the email addresses that had not responded to the survey in the past 12 quarters, our response rate would be in the 15-20% range -which is a good response rate. Second, Graham Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2011) show that the December 2008 response sample is fairly representative of the firms included in the commonly used Compustat database. Sixth, Graham, Harvey, Popadak and Rajgopal (2016) update the non-response bias test in a survey of 1,900 CFOs and find no evidence of non-response bias.
Data integrity
In each quarter, implement a series of rules to ensure the integrity of the data. We have, on average, 355 responses each quarter. However, in recent years the average number of responses has exceeded 400. There are a total of 23,086 survey observations. There are six key pieces of data: 1) the 10-year forecast (LT); 2) lower 10% of 10-year forecast (LLT); and 3) upper 10% of the 10-year forecast (ULT). We collect the analogous information for the one-year S&P 500 forecasts too (ST). This paper focuses on the 10-year forecasts but the short-term forecasts factor into our data filters.
Our exclusion rules are the following: 
The 2016 results
The expected market return questions are a subset of a larger set of questions in the quarterly survey of CFOs. The survey usually contains between eight and ten questions. Some of the questions are repeated every quarter and some change through time depending on economic conditions. The historical surveys can be accessed at http://www.cfosurvey.org. Appendix 1
shows the risk premium question in the most recent survey.
While the survey is anonymous, we collect demographic information on seven firm characteristics, including industry, sales revenue, number of employees, headquarters location, ownership (public or private), and proportion of foreign sales.
During the past 16 years, we have collected over 23,000 responses to the survey. Panel A of Table 1 presents the date that the survey window opened, the number of responses for each survey, the 10-year Treasury bond rate, as well as the average and median expected excess returns. There is relatively little time variation in the risk premium. This is confirmed in Fig. 1a , which displays the historical risk premiums contained in Table) .
2 See, for example, Ghysels (1998), Welch (2000 ), Ghysels (1998 ), Fraser (2001 , Harris and Marston (2001) , Pástor and Stambaugh (2001), Fama and French (2002) , Goyal and Welch (2003) , Graham and Harvey (2003) , Ang and Bekaert (2005) , Fernandez (2004 Fernandez ( , 2006 Fernandez ( , 2009 for studies of the risk premium. 3 Using the Ibbotson Associates data from January 1926 through July 2010, the arithmetic (geometric) average return on the S&P 500 over and above the 30-day U.S. Treasury bill is 7.75% (5.80%). Using data from April 1953-July 2010, the arithmetic (geometric) risk premium is 6.27% (5.12%). The risk premium over the 10 year bond should be reduced by 212 basis points for the arithmetic premium and 174 basis points for the geometric premium. Fama and French (2002) study the risk premium on the S&P 500 from 1872-2000 using fundamental data. They argue that the ex ante risk premia is between 2.55% and 4.32% for 1951-2000 period. Ibbotson and Chen (2001) estimate a long-term risk premium between 4 and 6%. Also see Siegel (1999) , Asness (2000) , Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Jagannathan, McGratten and Scherbina (2001) . A recent treatment is Sharpe and Suarez (2013) . We also report information on the average of the CFOs' assessments of the one in ten chance that the market will exceed or fall below a certain level. In the most recent survey, the worst case total return is +0.39% which is lower than the historic average of 1.52%. The best-case return is 9.71% which is also slightly lower than the average of 10.97%.
With information on the 10% tails, we construct a probability distribution for each respondent.
We use Davidson and Cooper's (1976) ULT and LLT. Keefer and Bodily (1983) show that this simple approximation is the preferred method of estimating the variance of a probability distribution of random variables, given information about the 10 th and 90 th percentiles. Like disagreement, the average of individual volatilities peaked in February 2009 at 4.29%. The current level, 3.52%, is very close to the overall average.
There is also a natural measure of asymmetry in each respondent's response. We look at the difference between each individual's 90% tail and the mean forecast and the mean minus the 10% tail. Hence, if the respondent's forecast of the excess return is 6% and the tails are -8% and +11%, then the distribution is negatively skewed with a value of -9% (=5%-14%). As with the usual measure of skewness, we cube this quantity and standardize by dividing by the cube of the individual standard deviation. In every quarter's survey, there is on average negative skewness in the individual forecasts. The average asymmetry -0.63 which is slightly lower than the average of -0.47. 
Risk premia, weighted average cost of capital and hurdle rates
The risk premia that we measure can be used in the calculation of the cost of capital. In a simple capital asset pricing model, the cost of equity capital would be the product of the company's beta times the risk premium along with the risk free rate. The average firm's cost of equity capital would be 6.63% (assuming a beta=1). Assuming the Baa bond yield is the borrowing rate and a 25% marginal tax rate, the weighted average cost of capital would be about 5.67%.
In previous surveys, we have asked CFOs about their weighted average cost of capital. For example, in March of 2011, companies told us that their internally calculated weighted average cost of capital was 10% (averaged across respondents). At the time, the cost of equity capital was similar to today, 6.45%. The bond yields were higher, with the Baa yielding 6.09%. The average firm (assuming average beta is 1.0) without any debt would have a WACC of 6.45%. When debt is introduced, the WACC would be less than 6.45% --which is sharply lower than the reported 10%.
Why is there such a divergence? One possible reason is that companies consider other factors in calculating the WACC -perhaps a multifactor model. 4 However, there is no evidence supporting this hypothesis. For example, consultants often add a premium for smaller firms based on the results in many research papers of a size premium. However, in our survey the average WACC for firms with less than $25 million in revenue is 10.6% and the WACC for the largest firms with annual revenue greater than $10 billion is 10.5%.
This analysis was replicated in June of 2012 with similar results. Given the same assumptions, the WACC is 5.37%. However, the average self-reported WACC is 9.3%. Again, there is no evidence of a size premium. The smallest firms reported a WACC of 9.3% and the largest firms 9.7%.
The WACC should not be confused with the investment hurdle rate. The WACC is an analytical calculation that combines a model-based cost of equity (such as the CAPM) and the after-tax cost of debt (reflected in current borrowing rates). Given capital constraints, firms often impose a higher hurdle rate on their investments. For example, to allocate capital to an investment that promises a projected return exactly at the firm's WACC is equivalent to accepting a zero net present value project.
The June 2012 survey also asked for the investment hurdle rates. They are much higher than the WACCs. The average rate was 13.5% (compared to the survey-reported WACC of 9.3% and the implied WACC from the survey based risk premium of 5.7%. Similar to the WACC results, there is no evidence that the hurdle rates are higher for small firms. Our evidence shows that the reported average hurdle rate for the smallest firms is 13.1% and for the largest firms the rate is 14.2%.
Even though we know from Graham and Harvey (2001) We learn the following: 1) the equity risk premium is much lower today than averages used over long-periods (e.g. from 1926) such as reported in Morningstar (2013) and Duff and Phelps (2015) ; 2) the survey questions asking directly about a company's WACC is consistent with companies routinely using long-horizon averages for inputs; and 3) WACCs should be thought as lower bounds -the Hurdle Rates used for actual investment decisions are 400bp higher than the stated WACCs. should vary with the business cycle. Premiums should be highest during recessions and lowest 5 Also see Sharpe and Suarez (2013) and Jagannathan et al. (2016) who analyze our CFO survey data.
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during recoveries. Previous research has used a variety of methods including looking at ex post realized returns to investigate whether there is business-cycle like variation in risk premia.
While we only have 60 observations and this limits our statistical analysis, we do see important differences. During recessions, the risk premium is 3.92% and during non-recessions, the premium falls to 3.46%.
Explaining variation in the risk premium
While we document the level and a limited time-series of the long-run risk premium, statistical inference is complicated by the fact that the forecasting horizons are overlapping. First, we have no way of measuring the accuracy of the risk premiums as forecasts of equity returns.
Second, any inference based on regression analysis is confounded by the fact that from one quarter to the next, there are 36 common quarters being forecasted. This naturally induces a moving-average process.
We do, however, try to characterize the time-variation in the risk premium without formal statistical tests. Figure 2 examines the relation between the mean premium and previous oneyear returns on the S&P 500. The evidence suggests that there is a weak negative correlation between past returns and the level of the long-run risk premium. This makes economic sense. When prices are low (after negative returns), expected return increase.
An alternative to using past-returns is to examine a measure of valuation. Figure 3 examines a scatter of the mean premium versus the forward price-to-earnings ratio of the S&P 500. The equity risk premium and the S&P 500 forward price-to-earnings ratio
Looking at the data in Figure 3 , it appears that the inference may be complicated by a non-linear relation. At very high levels of valuation, the expected return (the risk premium) was low.
We also examine the real yield on Treasury Inflation Indexed Notes. The risk premium is like an expected real return on the equity market. It seems reasonable that there could be a The equity risk premium and the real yield on Treasury Inflation Indexed Notes
Overall, there is a negative correlation of -0.517. However, this correlation is driven by the negative TIPS yields. This is consistent with the idea that in periods of heightened uncertainty, investors engage in a flight to safety and accept low or negative TIPS yields -and at the same time demand a high risk premium for investing in the equity market.
Finally, we consider two alternative measures of risk and the risk premium. Figure 5 shows that over our sample there is evidence of a strong positive correlation between market volatility and the long-term risk premium. We use a five-day moving average of the implied volatility on the S&P index option (VIX) as our volatility proxy. The correlation between the risk premium and volatility is 0.35. If the closing day of the survey is used, the correlation is roughly the same. Asset The equity risk premium and the implied volatility on the S&P 500 index option (VIX)
We also consider an alternative risk measure, the credit spread. We look at the correlation between Moody's Baa rated bond yields less the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the risk premium. Figure 6 shows a highly significant relation between the time-series with a correlation of 0.49. Similar to Figure 5 , there is a strong recent divergence. The equity risk premium and credit spreads
Other survey questions
The June 2016 survey contains a number of other questions. http://www.cfosurvey.org presents the full results of these questions. The site also presents results conditional on demographic firm characteristics. For example, one can examine the CFOs views of the risk premium conditional on the industry in which the CFO works.
Risk premium data and corporate policies
Research by Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2013) uses the one-year risk premium forecasts as a measure of optimism and the 80% confidence intervals as a direct measure of overconfidence. By linking email addresses that respondents provide to archival corporate data, Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) use the survey during the financial crisis and the higher risk premiums to examine the implications of financial constraints on the real activities of the firm. They provide new evidence on the negative impact of financial constraints on firms' investment plans.
Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011) use the survey during the financial crisis to study how firms managed liquidity during the financial crisis.
Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) administer a psychometric test using the survey instrument and link CEO optimism and risk aversion to corporate financial policies.
Graham, Harvey and Puri (2015) use survey data to study how capital is allocated within the firm and the degree to which CEOs delegate decision making to CFOs. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) use survey data to study how managers manipulate earnings. Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013) study earnings quality. Graham, Harvey, Popadak and Rajgopal (2016) use a similar survey sample to study corporate culture. Both of the Duke-CFO optimism measures significantly predict all five of these popular barometers of economic confidence. Related analysis shows that our CFO survey anticipates economic activity sooner (usually one quarter sooner) than do the other surveys.
CFO Survey compared to other surveys
Conclusions
We provide a direct measure of ten-year market returns based on a multi-year survey of Chief Financial Officers. Importantly, we have a 'measure' of expectations. We do not claim it is the true market expectation. Nevertheless, the CFO measure has not been studied before.
While there is relatively little time-variation in the risk premium, premia are higher during recessions and higher during periods of uncertainty. We also link our analysis to the actual investment decisions of financial managers. We are able to impute the weighted average cost of capital given the CFO estimates of equity risk premia, current corporate bond yields and marginal tax rates. This imputed measure is significantly less than the WACCs that CFOs report using in project evaluation. One way to reconcile this is that CFOs use very long-term averages of equity premia and bond rates when calculating WACCs. We provide evidence on the actual hurdle rates used by companies. These hurdle rates are, on average, 400bp higher than the reported WACCs.
While we have over 23,000 survey responses in 16 years, much of our analysis uses summary statistics for each survey. As such, with only 65 unique quarters of predictions and a variable of interest that has a 10-year horizon, it is impossible to evaluate the accuracy of the market excess return forecasts. For example, the June 4, 2007 10-year annual forecast was 7.83% and the realized annual S&P 500 return through June 2, 2016 is 3.2%. Our analysis shows some weak correlation between past returns, real interest rates and the risk premium. In contrast, there is significant evidence on the relation between two common measures of economic risk and the risk premium. We find that both the implied volatility on the S&P index as well as a commonly used measure of credit spreads are correlated with our measured equity risk premium.
